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Abstract
This paper aims to show that Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is an efﬁcient
tool to assist investors in multiple criteria decision-making tasks like assessing hedge
fund performance. DEA has the merit of offering investors the possibility to con-
sider simultaneously multiple evaluation criteria with direct control over the priority
level paid to each criterion. By addressing main methodological issues regarding the
use of DEA in evaluating hedge fund performance, this paper attempts to provide
investors sufﬁcient guidelines for tailoring their own performance measure which re-
ﬂect successfully their own preferences. Although these guidelines are formulated in
the hedge fund context, they can also be applied to other kinds of investment funds.
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The highly successful performance of the so-called hedge funds over the past two decades,
notably during the long bull equity market of the 1990s, has made them quickly well-
known to ﬁnancial communities as well as to the public. While hedge funds still manage
only $1 trillion at the end of 2004, a fraction of the $8 trillion invested by mutual funds,
their assets have ballooned from only about $150 billion a decade ago. With over 8,000
hedge funds now available, fund selecting is quite challenging for investors. Hence,
before any due-diligence process, investors ﬁrst need an efﬁcient tool to assist them in
screening task in which the most important evaluation is undoubtedly fund (historical)
performance.
In general, the historical performance of funds is deﬁned as their return adjusted
for risk. According to traditional ﬁnancial theories, the risk is measured either by the
standard deviation of returns or by the correlation of fund returns with market factors
via different betas1. Most of these measures, even though validated in ”buy-and-hold”
portfolios of mutual funds and pension funds, are irrelevant within the context of hedge
funds. On the one hand, hedge fund returns are documented as usually asymmetric and
kurtotic, a feature largely imputed to the intensive use of short sales, leverage, derivative
instruments and to the free call-option like incentive structure, all speciﬁc to only the
hedge fund industry. On the other hand, their short-term movements across diverse asset
categories and the market neutral absolute investment objective of hedge fund managers
make it really delicate to identify market factors necessary to the use of multi-factorial
models2. Recent techniques enlarge the evaluation dimension to the skewness (Stutzer
2000), the skewness and the kurtosis (Gregoriou & Gueyie 2003) or to the whole dis-
tribution of returns (Keating & Shadwick 2002) in order to take into account the non
normality of return distributions. Despite this signiﬁcant progress, these measures do
not allow considering after-net-returns fees paid by investors if only. Besides, most of
them are restrictive in the sense that they often assume very simplistic decision-making
rules which are common to all investors.
Yet, it is well documented that actual evaluation criteria, in fact, may be more com-
plicated and differ signiﬁcantly from theoretical formulations. Not only are there many
1When fund’s risk is measured by betas, fund performance is simply the alpha.
2Unlike other kinds of investment funds, hedge funds are loosely regulated, and in many cases, are
largely exempted from legal obligations as the case of offshore hedge funds. Hedge fund managers thus
have a broad ﬂexibility in determining the proportion of securities they hold, the type of positions (long or
short) they take and the leverage level they make. As a consequence, they are free to make very short-term
movements across diverse asset categories involving frequent use of short sales, leverage and derivatives to









































6attributes to consider, each one being associated with a priority level, but also these at-
tributes and their importance level are usually quite speciﬁc to each investor. The need to
consider simultaneously multiple criteria while incorporating investors’ own preferences
is natural since they are do not always share the same ﬁnancial objective, risk aversion, in-
vestment horizon, etc. From such perspectives, the Data Envelopment Analysis approach
(hereafter, DEA) seems particularly appealing as it provides the possibility of incorpo-
rating many criteria at the same time, together with a direct control over the importance
level paid to each criterion by means of a tailor-made optimizing system.
DEA can be roughly deﬁned as a mathematical optimizing technique ﬁrst introduced
by Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1978), based on Farrell (1957)’s efﬁciency concept, to
measure the efﬁciency (technical, allocative, economic, etc.) of decision-making units
(hereafter, DMU) whose objective consists in transforming multiple inputs into multiple
outputs. The merits of the DEA method lies in providing an unique aggregate measure
for each DMU from a system of multiple inputs and multiple outputs and in putting
emphasis on the ”best observed practices” in a comparative perspective. In addition,
DEA allows considering inputs and outputs whose measure units are different, a property
known as ”units invariance”3. Furthermore, it makes no assumption on the form of the
relation between inputs and outputs.
Because of its many advantages, DEA has been applied in various ﬁelds including
public administration (to evaluate hospitals, administrative ofﬁces, educational establish-
ments or to resolve siting problems), engineering (to evaluate airplanes and engines),
commerce (to evaluate supermarkets), ﬁnance (to evaluate bank branches, micro-ﬁnance
institutions, assurance companies, to identify dominant ﬁnancial assets and recently to
assess investment funds’ performance). The application of DEA is generally proceeded
in two main perspectives: (1) to evaluate the efﬁciency of DMUs whose activities are to
employ inputs to produce outputs; and (2) to solve decision-making problems with mul-
tiple criteria. It is in the second perspective that DEA can be applied to assess hedge fund
performance. Initiated by Murthi et al. (1997) to evaluate empirically the performance of
mutual funds, this idea has been applied and revisited by several studies, including those
on hedge fund performance. However, this literature is composed essentially of empiri-
cal applications, methodological issues remain either ignored or discussed in a simplistic
and superﬁcial manner with little directive value. To the best of my knowledge, none of
methodological studies investigates the use of DEA in the hedge fund context.
3This is true provided that unit measures are the same for all DMUs in the sample. For example, one per-
son can measure outputs in mile and inputs in gallons of gasoline and quarts of oil while another measures









































6Following this literature, this paper is devoted to methodological issues in applying
DEA to hedge fund performance appraisal. Speciﬁcally, I focus on the choice of evaluation
criteria (DEA’s inputs and outputs), the choice of DEA models with and without negative
data on returns and performance, and on ”transcribing” speciﬁc evaluating preferences
of investors into mathematical constraints. By doing so, this study attempts to offer
investors sufﬁcient guidelines in order to apply successfully the DEA method to assessing
hedge fund performance. Although it only addresses the hedge fund context, the whole
framework is completely applicable to mutual funds, pension funds, ethical funds, etc.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews brieﬂy the
literature related to this study. Section 2 introduces basic concepts of the DEA method.
Section 3 addresses methodological issues of applying DEA to screening hedge funds
via their performance. Section 4 provides several numerical illustrations on a sample
including 38 hedge funds. The last section summaries and concludes the paper.
1 Related literature
This study emanates from two main streams of literature. The ﬁrst one concerns DEA’s
use in making a selection when decision-makers have multiple criteria. The second
evolves evaluating the performance of investment funds by means of the DEA method.
With respect to the ﬁrst literature, three studies can be enumerated: Thompson et al.
(1986), Tone (1999) and Powers & McMullen (2000). Thompson et al. (1986) dealt with
identifying feasible sites among six candidate sites for location of a very high-energy
physics lab in Texas. A comparative analysis between six sites was conducted by applying
the basic DEA model, incorporating project cost, user time delay, and environmental
impact data as selection criteria. These criteria are those evaluators want to minimize,
they thus forme exclusively the DEA’s inputs. Being absent, the output is assumed to be
unique and equal to unity so that DEA can be applied. This setting is naturally plausible
as it is equivalent to considering inputs per one unity of output4. In the same spirit,
Tone (1999) described a japanese governmental project applying DEA to select a city to
take over some political functions of Tokyo as a new capital. In this study, the selection
criteria are composed of distance from Tokyo, safety indexes (regarding earthquakes and
volcanoes), access to an international airport, ease of land acquisition, landscape, water
supply, matters with historical associations; they form exclusively DEA’s outputs. The









































6input is thus set to be equal to unity5. It is important to note that in these studies,
only inputs (outputs) are available and thus output (input) is assumed to be unique and
equal to 1. Another common interesting point is that the evaluators, with prior expert
knowledge about the relative importance of chosen criteria, ﬁxe lower and upper bounds
to the weights associated with each criterion in the mathematical optimization. In ﬁnance,
Powers & McMullen (2000) suggested using DEA to select dominant stocks among the
185 american largest capitalization stocks because this technique makes it possible to
incorporate multiple selection attributes such as the Price-Earnings Ratio, the systematic
risk and the total risk (DEA’s inputs), the Earnings Per Share ratio and the mean return
over 1 year, 3 years, 5 years and 10 years (DEA’s outputs).
The second literature relates to studies using DEA to evaluate the performance of
mutual funds, ethical funds and more recently hedge funds. Studies on mutual funds
include Murthi et al. (1997), McMullen & Strong (1998), Choi & Murthi (2001), Basso &
Funari (2001), Tarim & Karan (2001) and Sengupta (2003). All these studies assume that
fund performance is a combination of multiple attributes such as mean returns (DEA’s
outputs), total or systematic risk, expenses6, and sometimes even fund size, turnover
speed and minimum initial investment (DEA’s inputs). In the same vein, Basso & Funari
(2003) suggested putting in the DEA’s outputs, together with the mean return, an indi-
cator measuring funds’ ethical level fulﬁllments since according to them, ”the solidarity
and social responsibility features that characterize the ethical funds satisfy the fulﬁllment
of humanitarian aims, but may lower the investment proﬁtability”.
The application of DEA in evaluating hedge funds emerged from the work of Gre-
goriou (2003). It was then supported by Gregoriou et al. (2005)7 and discussed in Kooli
et al. (2005). A common feature of these studies is that they only consider risk–return
performance without referring to fees. Besides, risks and returns are approximated re-
spectively by lower variations (what investors seek to minimize) and upper variations
(what investors seek to maximize) compared to a threshold deﬁned by mean return.
Speciﬁcally, the inputs are composed of lower mean monthly semi-skewness, lower mean
monthly semi-variance and mean monthly lower return; the outputs include upper mean
monthly semi-skewness, upper mean monthly semi-variance and mean monthly upper
return. Another common feature is that they put emphasis on fund’s absolute rankings by
5I did not have access to documents related to this project. All the information mentioned here is extracted
from Cooper et al. (2000, p.169).
6The concept of expenses differs from study to study. It might include transaction costs and administration
fees (totaled in expense ratio) and loads (subscription or/and redemption costs).
7Gregoriou et al. (2005) is an extended version of Gregoriou (2003) and more complete while employing









































6employing modiﬁed DEA techniques: super–efﬁciency (Andersen & Petersen 1993) and
cross–efﬁciency (Sexton et al. 1986). By comparing DEA results with rankings provided
by Sharpe and modiﬁed Sharpe ratios via rank correlation coefﬁcients, they observed a
weak consistency between DEA and these measures. In particular, Kooli et al. (2005)
found quite low correlation between DEA rankings and rankings given by the stochastic
dominance technique and concluded to a weak relevancy of DEA to fund performance
evaluation context. With regard to super-efﬁciency and cross-efﬁciency models, despite
their appealing property, i.e. providing fund absolute rankings, their technical caveats
cast doubts about their efﬁcacy8. Hence, in what follows, I will only introduce the basic
DEA model and its dichotomic classiﬁcation into assessing hedge fund performance.
2 DEA’s approach
2.1 DEA as a measure of technical efﬁciency
Before introducing the general approach of DEA and the basic DEA model, it is im-
portant to distinguish the ”technical efﬁciency”, on which is based this study, from the
”economic efﬁciency” usually applied in production context. According to Fried, Lovell
& Schmidt (1993, p.9-10), ”productive efﬁciency has two components. The purely tech-
nical, or physical, component refers to the ability to avoid waste by producing as much
output as input usage allows, or by using as little input as output production allows....
The allocative, or price, or economic, component refers to the ability to combine inputs
and outputs in optimal proportions in light of prevailing prices.”. Consequently, tech-
nical efﬁciency measurement is based solely on quantity information on the inputs and
the outputs whereas the economic efﬁciency necessitates the recourse to information on
prices as well as on economic behavioral objectives of producers (cost minimization, proﬁt
maximization or revenue maximization). Conceptually, the efﬁciency of each DMU un-
der evaluation is determined by the distance from the point representing this DMU to
the efﬁcient frontier (production frontier in the case of technical efﬁciency; cost, revenue
or proﬁt frontier in the case of cost, revenue or proﬁt efﬁciency respectively). In ﬁgure 1,
the isoquant L(y) represents various combinations of two inputs that a perfectly efﬁcient
8The super-efﬁciency model has two main caveats. First, it allocates so excessively high efﬁciency score to
efﬁcient DMUs having extreme values of inputs and outputs that optimal values can sometimes ”explode”.
Second, it is infeasible in some circumstances (Zhu 1996, Seiford & Zhu 1999). The pitfall of the cross-
efﬁciency model is that it penalizes DMUs whose the combination of inputs and outputs is different from
the others while it highly praises average DMUs. Besides, the use of the mean, the variance, the mode or























































































Figure 1: Technical efﬁciency versus economic efﬁciency with two inputs (Farrell, 1957)
ﬁrm like Q or Q′ might use to produce an unit of output. The line CC′ whose slope is
equal to the ratio of the prices of the two inputs represents the price constraint that all the
ﬁrms must face. Farrell (1957) deﬁned OQ/OP as the technical efﬁciency level, OR/OQ
as the price (cost) efﬁciency and OR/OP as the overall efﬁciency of the ﬁrm P. In DEA,
the production frontier against which the technical efﬁciency of each DMU is derived is
empirically constructed from observed DMUs, and thus without any assumption on the
functional relation between inputs and outputs9. In other words, it is formed by a set of
best practices (the most efﬁcient DMUs) and the other DMUs are enveloped by this fron-
tier, which explains the origin of the name ”Data Envelopment Analysis” of this method.
For the shake of brevity, hereafter I will use the term ”efﬁciency” to refer to the technical
efﬁciency and the term ”efﬁciency frontier” to denote the production frontier.
2.2 DEA’s basic model — CCR (1978)
2.2.1 The general formulation
Consider n DMUs under evaluation that use m inputs (X) to produce s outputs (Y) with
X and Y are semipositive10. The efﬁciency score hk assigned to the DMU k is the solution
9In econometric methods, the efﬁcient frontier is estimated by supposing a particular form of the produc-
tion function (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, translog, etc.).
10The semipositivity signiﬁes that all data are nonnegative but at least one component of every input and































































≤ 1, j = 1,...,n (2)
ur,vi ≥ ε,r = 1,...,s; i = 1,...,m (3)
where k is the DMU under evaluation, yrj is the amount of the output r of the DMUj, xij is
the amount of the input i of the DMUj, ur and vi (also called ”absolute weights”) are the
weights assigned respectively to the output r and the input i, ε is an inﬁnitesimal positive
number imposed to assure that no input or output is ignored in the optimization, vixij
and uryrj are called ”virtual weights” of respectively the input i and the output r of the
DMUj.
Mathematically, the model’s objective is to seek for the most favorable (positive)
weight system associated with each input and each output which maximizes the weighted
sum of the outputs over the weighted sum of the inputs of the DMUk (hk), provided that
this ratio does not exceed 1 for any DMU in the sample (reﬂected by constraint (2)).
Given that the efﬁciency frontier contains efﬁcient DMUs and envelopes inefﬁcient ones,
and that the efﬁciency level of each DMU is, by deﬁnition, the distance from its position
to the efﬁciency frontier, it is natural to ﬁxe the maximal value of the objective function
to unity11. Thus efﬁcient DMUs will obtain a score of 1 and inefﬁcient DMUs a score
smaller than 1.
Conceptually, each DMU is free to choose its own combination of inputs and outputs
so that it is as desirable as possible compared to other DMUs in the same category. Obvi-
ously, this combination must also be technically ”feasible” for others, that is the efﬁciency
level of any other DMU using this combination should not exceed the maximum attain-
able bounded by the efﬁciency curve (the constraint (2) is thus also applied to j = 1,...,n
with j  = k). The idea is that if one DMU can not attain an efﬁciency rating of 100% under
this set of weights, then it can never be attained from any other set. It should be noted
that in practice, more constraints on weight systems can be imposed to take into account
11Mathematically, the maximal value of the objective function can be given any other number without
changing the relative efﬁciency of the DMUs. The choice of unity is to assure the coherence between mathe-









































6speciﬁc preferences of decision-makers. This point will be illustrated further.






















≥ 1, j = 1,...,n (5)
ur,vi ≥ ε,r = 1,...,s;i = 1,...,m (6)
where the objective is to seek for optimal weights so as to minimize the ratio of the
weighted sum of inputs to the weighted sum of outputs. The smaller this ratio, the better.
In this case, efﬁcient DMUs have a score of 1 and inefﬁcient ones have a score greater
than 1. Note however that the system (4-6) is less familiar within DEA’s applications in
ﬁnance than the system (1-3).
It is important to keep in mind that basic DEA models do provide a dichotomic classi-
ﬁcation, not a complete ranking of DMUs as all efﬁcient DMUs have the same score equal
to 1. Besides, efﬁciency or inefﬁciency of DMUs is solely relative to the sample under
consideration. Hence, once the sample is modiﬁed, results may be very different.
2.2.2 The primal program
The optimizing systems (1-3) and (4-6) are fractional problems, non convex with frac-
tional constraints, which are quite difﬁcult to solve. According to Charnes & Cooper
(1962, 1973) and Charnes et al. (1978), the fractional problem (1-3) (or 4-6) can be con-
veniently converted into an equivalent linear programming problem by normalizing the
denominator to 1 and maximizing (minimizing) the nominator. By doing so, we obtain





























































vixij, j = 1,...,n (9)





















vixij, j = 1,...,n (13)
ur,vi ≥ ε,r = 1,...,s; i = 1,...,m (14)
The input-oriented (output-oriented) version assumes that only inputs (outputs) can
be adjusted, outputs (inputs) being ﬁxed.
2.2.3 The dual program
According to linear programming theories, each primal program is associated with a dual
program which provides the same optimal value of the objective function as the primal.













λjyrj,r = 1,...,s (17)
λj ≥ 0,θ unconstrained in sign (18)
with θ and λ are dual variables. Note that θ can not, by construction, exceed unity12.
12We can easily see that θ = 1, λk = 1, λj = 0 (j  = k) is a feasible solution to (15-18). Hence, the optimal






















































γjyrj,r = 1,...,s (21)
γj ≥ 0,η unconstrained in sign (22)
where η and γ are dual variables and η can not be, by construction, lower than 1.
In fact, the primal program can be solved directly to obtain the optimal efﬁciency
score. However, the dual program is usually preferred for the following reasons. On the
one hand, it is mathematically easier to ﬁnd the optimal solution via the dual because of
a considerable reduction of constraints: from n + s + m + 1 constraints in the primal to
only s + m constraints in the dual. This calculating parsimony is of particularly appeal-
ing when dealing with large samples. On the other hand, the dual formulation has an
interesting economic interpretation. In economic terms, under the input-oriented form
(output-oriented form), the dual looks for a feasible activity — a virtual DMU which is
a linear combination of the best practices — that guarantees (uses) the output level yk
(the input level xk) of the DMUk in all components while using only a proportion of the
DMUk’s inputs θxik (producing higher outputs than DMUk’s outputs, ηyrk with η ≥ 1 ).
Hence, θ (or η) is deﬁned as a measure of the efﬁciency level of the DMUk. Graphically,
in the input-output plan depicted in ﬁgure 2, under the input-oriented or input contrac-
tion setting, θ of the DMU A is the ratio DC/DA, with C being the virtual DMU which
serves as benchmark to measure the efﬁciency of A; under the output-oriented or output
expansion setting, η of the DMU A is measured by FH/AH with F being the reference
DMU for A now.
In order to obtain the efﬁciency scores of n DMUs, the optimizing system (primal or
dual) must be run n times with each time the DMU under evaluation changes.
Theorem 1 (Connexion between the CCR input-oriented version and the CCR output-oriented
version) Let (θ∗,λ∗) be an optimal solution for the CCR input-oriented version. Then (1/θ∗,λ∗/θ∗) =
(η∗,γ∗) is optimal for the corresponding CCR output-oriented version. Similarly, if (η∗,γ∗) is
optimal for the CCR output-oriented version, then (1/η∗,γ∗/η∗) = (θ∗,λ∗) is optimal for the
corresponding CCR output-oriented version (Seiford et al. 2004, p.17).






























































































































Figure 2: CCR efﬁciency frontier
3 A DEA framework for hedge fund performance appraisal
In ﬁnancial literature, funds’ historical performance is often measured by the ratio of
return to risk. Traditionally founded on the ”mean-variance” basis, the evaluation di-
mension has been recently extended to the skewness (Stutzer index — Stutzer (2000)), to
the skewness and the kurtosis (the modiﬁed Sharpe ratio — Gregoriou & Gueyie (2003)),
even to the whole distribution of returns (Omega index — Keating & Shadwick (2002))
in an attempt to take into account the non normality features of returns. Despite this
improvement, most of these measures are highly restrictive in the sense that they usually
assume simplistic decision-making rules common to all investors.
Yet, there are suggestions that actual individual decisions differ signiﬁcantly from
theoretical formulations since they are much more complicated and quite speciﬁc to in-
vestors. Often there are more attributes to consider and for each investor, each attribute
does not necessarily have the same priority level. While some investors are more con-
cerned with central tendencies (mean, variance), others may care more about extreme
values (skewness, kurtosis). One kind of such preferences is summarized by the posi-
tive preference for skewness ﬁrst invoked by Arditti (1967) and then supported by Jean
(1971), Kraus & Litzenberger (1976), Francis & Archer (1979), Scott & Horvath (1980),
Kane (1982), Broihanne et al. (2004). It implies that individuals prefer portfolio A to port-
folio B with higher mean return if both portfolios have the same variance, and if portfolio
A has greater positive skewness, all higher moments being the same. In other words,
individuals may attach more importance to the skewness than to the mean of returns.









































6same preference structure for all investors. Consider for example the modiﬁed Sharpe
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where r is the mean return, rf is the average risk-free rate, W is the amount of portfolio
at risk, µ is the mean return and naturally equal to r, σ is the standard deviation of
returns, S is the skewness, K is the kurtosis excess, zc is the critical value for probability
(1− α) (zc = −1.96 for a 95% probability), MVAR (modiﬁed value-at-risk) is introduced
by Favre & Galeano (2002). According to Favre & Galeano (2002) and Gregoriou & Gueyie
(2003), all investors are certainly concerned about the skewness and the kurtosis of returns
but they share the same preference structure which is necessarily in the form of MVAR.
This rigidity is not only restrictive but might bias signiﬁcantly investors’ choice of funds
as their true evaluation criteria are not considered at all or considered but in a biased
manner.
In addition to that, investors may need to take account of sales loads charged by the
fund on their entrance into (front-end sales load) or/and on their exit of the fund (back-
end or deferred sales load). Unlike management fees which are directly deducted from
the fund’s value, sales loads are charged on the net returns paid to investors13. As a
result, a fund with good performance and a high percentage of loads is not necessarily
more attractive than another fund which has lower performance but charges lower loads.
Moreover, as argued by McMullen & Strong (1998), Morey & Morey (1999) and Powers
& McMullen (2000), investors may also be concerned about fund’s performances over
various time horizons (over the last year, the last 3 years, the last 5 years and sometimes
the last 10 years). Such information is undoubtedly valuable as it provides much more
informative insight into fund’s perspective than the performance over only one horizon.
Furthermore, even when investors care about the return and the risk, or the perfor-
mance of funds over only one horizon, it is often quite difﬁcult to choose an absolutely
13Murthi et al. (1997), McMullen & Strong (1998), Tarim & Karan (2001), Choi & Murthi (2001) and Sen-
gupta (2003) advocated incorporating also expense ratio (in percentage of fund assets, covering various
operating expenses incurred by the fund management such as management fees, administrative fees, ad-
visory fees) in evaluating fund performance. This element which is obviously necessary to appraise the
performance of funds in a productivity perspective, i.e. their capacity to exploit efﬁciently input resources
(fund expenses are considered here as a production factor), is irrelevant in this context where inputs and
outputs are selection criteria chosen by investors. In this regard, investors are not likely concerned by these
expenses as they are directly deducted before calculating funds’ net asset value — the real value of investors’









































6suitable measure among a wide range of existing measures in the literature. This dif-
ﬁculty is particularly true for the choice of risk and performance indicators because of
inexistence or deﬁciency of mechanisms to validate empirically them. Consequently, in-
vestors are sometimes in need of considering simultaneously several measures. Here
again, they do not necessarily share the same preferences for such and such measures.
Given these speciﬁcities in performance evaluating practices, the DEA’s approach
seems very appealing. In fact, the application of DEA into hedge fund performance
appraisal can be made in two perspectives. The ﬁrst one consists in evaluating the
productive performance of funds where the latter are considered as a particular type of
production units which employs multiple resources (risks, various operating expenses,
turnover speed, etc.) to realize proﬁts (returns). The second, which is in the spirit of
Thompson et al. (1986), Tone (1999) and Powers & McMullen (2000), aims to assess funds
as decision–making units whose inputs and outputs are evaluation criteria chosen by
decision-makers. It is the second perspective that interests investors as DEA, with its
broad ﬂexibility, allows investors to tailor their own evaluation tools corresponding the
most to their own preferences. Since each investor naturally has different risk aversion
levels, performance objectives and other distinct constraints, the tailor-made possibility is
essential to correctly screen fund.
In this context, the DEA method can be applied to evaluate either the ”local” perfor-
mance or the ”global” performance of hedge funds. By the ”local performance”, I imply
the performance measured by the weighted sum of several criteria of gain (or return)
on the weighted sum of several criteria of risk and possibly certain types of expenses. In
contrast, the term ”global performance” denotes the performance synthesized from either
several measures of ”local” performance, or elementary performances over several tem-
poral horizons. Within this framework, the application of DEA (in its basic form) raises
four main questions: (1) how to choose inputs and outputs, (2) what version to choose
(input-oriented or output-oriented), (3) how to deal with negative values in the inputs
or/and the outputs if they exist14, and (4) how to incorporate more speciﬁc preferences
of investors into the mathematical formulation. If the ﬁrst, the second and the fourth
questions are relevant to any application ﬁelds, the third one is quite speciﬁc to data of
returns and performances. These issues will be addressed successively in what follows.









































63.1 Evaluation criteria and the choice of inputs and outputs
Unlike applications of DEA in production ﬁelds where inputs and outputs are tangible
elements, the choice of inputs and outputs is not straightforward when dealing with fund
performance. Nevertheless, in a multiple criteria decision-making framework, it is logical
to consider inputs as criteria that investors want to minimize and outputs as those they
want to maximize. Hence, if investors seek to evaluate the funds’ ”local” performance, i.e.
returns15 to risks, the inputs can be (1) several measures of risk (standard deviation, kur-
tosis, beta, various measures of value-at-risk) over one (or several) horizon(s), (2) possibly
the sales loads; the outputs can be composed of (1) several measures of returns (mean,
skewness) — over one (or several) horizon(s). The difference between the conﬁguration
suggested here (to evaluate fund ”local” performance) and that assumed by standard
performance indicators is that according to the former, each investor knows perfectly his
relevant evaluation criteria but does not know the functional relation between these cri-
teria as well as the exact trade-off between them, which is not the case of the modiﬁed
Sharpe ratio as previously described. The case where investors know the relative trade-off
between these criteria will be discussed further.
Otherwise, if investors want to evaluate funds by considering several elementary per-
formances simultaneously, they can calculate the global performance by (1) including in
the outputs either the performances measured by the same technique on several periods,
or the performances on the same period but measured by several indicators, (2) setting
the input equal to one. It is important to notice that in this setting, all selection criteria are
those investors want to maximize, they thus form exclusively DEA’s outputs; meanwhile,
there is no input. Assuming the presence of one input equal to 1 makes it possible to
apply DEA without any modiﬁcation of results. As explained earlier, we are in a basic
conﬁguration in which there is one input and several outputs and the quantity of each
output is often ”standardized” by the quantity of the input to obtain the unit outputs
(per one unit of the input) in order to facilitate calculations. This setting is employed by
Thompson et al. (1986) and Tone (1999).
Following the principles evoked above, each investor will determine, according to his
own preferences, the inputs and outputs for DEA while complying with general rules as:
– Inputs and outputs must be criteria indispensable to the appraisal of fund perfor-
15The term ”return” should be understood here in broad sense. In traditional language of portfolio the-
ories, the concept of return is always associated to the arithmetic mean of elementary returns over a given
period. By ”return”, I imply in what follows any measure, in addition to the mean return, that is indicative










































– The number of inputs and outputs should be lower than the number of funds. In
general, the number of funds should be at least three times larger than the number
of inputs and outputs.
Any violation of these rules will lead to a deﬁciency of the discriminatory power of DEA.
As a result, we risk obtaining an excessive number of dominant (efﬁcient) funds whereas
some of them are not rightly so16.
3.2 Input-oriented or output-oriented versions ?
In general, when inputs and outputs are semipositive, the choice between the CCR input-
oriented version and the CCR output-oriented version can be simply made at users’ dis-
cretion following their preferences. Note that the input-oriented version (output-oriented
version) assumes that outputs (inputs) are ﬁxed, only inputs (outputs) can be adjusted.
This assumption conditions the reference fund on the efﬁcient frontier to which is com-
pared the target fund and thus determines the distance between the former and the latter,
this distance measuring the efﬁciency level of the latter. The theorem 1 describes the cor-
respondence between the optimal solutions of the two versions. We can easily see that
the two versions of the CCR model provides the same classiﬁcation of inefﬁcient DMUs17
(efﬁcient DMUs always obtain a full score of 1 under any version). Nevertheless, it is
interesting to notice that all studies which apply DEA to evaluating fund performance
adopted the input-oriented version whatever the DEA model is used. This popularity
is undoubtedly due to the fact that this mathematical form shares the same logic as
Markowitz’s efﬁcient frontier construction, that is to minimize the risks (inputs) for a
deﬁned level of returns (outputs).
However, when there are only outputs (inputs), the input-oriented (output-oriented)
version is required as in this case, we assume the existence of one input (output) whose
quantity is ﬁxed equal to 1.
16The terms ”dominant funds” and ”efﬁcient funds” will be used interchangeably hereafter to indicate
funds having a full efﬁciency score of 1.
17It is important to specify that this equivalence between the input-oriented version and the output-









































63.3 Dealing with negative inputs and outputs
DEA models as originally designed require that inputs and outputs are semipositive,
i.e. all inputs and all outputs are non negative and at least one input and one output
are positive. In many application ﬁelds like production economics, negative inputs and
outputs naturally make no sense. However, in fund performance appraisal context, it is
likely that we sometimes have negative values like mean, skewness of returns, or some
performance indicators, etc.
Although in the CCR model, or more generally in basic DEA models, inputs and
outputs are systematically required to be semipositive, we can easily see that negative
values in inputs and outputs are tolerated in following ways without any incidence on
the solubility of DEA optimizing systems (Cooper et al. 2000, p.304-305):
– If there are at least one input and one output positif, either the input-oriented ver-
sion or the output-oriented version can be used;
– If all outputs (inputs) are negative and at least one input (output) is positive, the
input-oriented (output-oriented) version is required;
– If there is no (effective) input (output) and all outputs (inputs) are negative, the
input-oriented (output-oriented) version is required;
– The case where all inputs and all outputs are negative at the same time, which is
extremely rare in fund performance appraisal context, can not be dealt with within
the DEA framework.
Note that in the second and the third cases, the optimal value of the objective function
will be negative.
3.4 Taking account of investors’ more speciﬁc preferences
The CCR model as presented earlier allows a quasi-absolute freedom in the determination
of the weights {u,v} so that each funds obtains a maximum score of efﬁciency, given its
input and output level. Speciﬁcally, {u,v} are only required to be equal to or greater than
an inﬁnitesimal positive number ε. This constraint is essential to assure that all selected
evaluation criteria are considered in the evaluating process. Nevertheless, such ﬂexibility
level also implies that important, even excessive, weights can be assigned to the input(s)









































6As a result, this setting is only plausible when investors have no idea about the trade-
off between the selected criteria. When such information is available, it can be easily
incorporated in DEA optimizing systems by restricting the absolute weights {u,v} or the
virtual weights {uy,vx} associated with each input and each output.
An investor in full knowledge of the ”price” range for each evaluation criterion —
e.g. the coefﬁcient of aversion to the mean, the variance, the skewness or the kurtosis of
returns — can have recourse to constraints like:
ur ≤ ξr (24)
vi ≥ ψi (25)
αr ≤ ur ≤ βr (26)
γi ≤ vi ≤ δi (27)
An investor who knows more or less his personal or conventional trade-off or substi-








πivi + πi+1vi+1 ≤ vi+2 (30)
An investor who wants to control the relative importance of each criterion in the per-














uryrj ≤ ur+1yr+1,j (33)
vixij ≤ vi+1xi+1,j (34)
where ξ,ψ,α, β,ζ,κ,a,b,c,d are values pre-deﬁned by investors to bound absolute and
virtual weights.









































6variety of investors’ preferences. The constraints mentioned above are to give examples
of ”transcribing” more speciﬁc preferences into mathematical formulations. A numerical
illustration will be provided further.
This possibility of exerting a direct control on the relative importance of each evalu-
ation criteria in assessing fund performance, along with the choice of evaluation criteria
(inputs and outputs), makes it possible for each investor to conceive a customized mea-
sure corresponding to his preferences. With such quality, the DEA approach is an efﬁcient
and complementary tool to other existing measures.
4 Illustrative applications
4.1 Data
To illustrate the use of DEA in assessing the performance of hedge funds, I used a sample
of 38 hedge funds belonging to the category Equity Hedge18. Data includes 60 monthly
returns covering the period of January 2000 to December 2004. Table 1 reports some
descriptive statistics of these funds.
As we can see, return distributions of many funds show highly positive (negative)
skewness signifying higher probability of extreme positive (negative) values compared
to that implied by the normal distribution. Besides, many of them possess high kurto-
sis excess, which indicates more returns close to the central value but also more regular
large positive or negative returns than in a normal distribution. The normality assump-
tion of return distributions is tested by means of three tests: Shapiro-Wilk, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov, and Jarque-Bera. Results provided by the Shapiro-Wilk and Jarque-Bera tests are
quite similar although they are rather different from those provided by the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. This divergence is likely due to the sample’s limit size as the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test is more appropriate to large samples. According to the Shapiro-Wilk test,
documented as the most reliable for small samples, the normality assumption is rejected
in 14 out of 38 cases at the conﬁdence level of 95%. These ﬁndings imply much higher
return or risk of these funds than those approximated under normality assumption. They
thus highlight the importance of incorporating moments of order higher than the mean
and the variance when appraising funds’ return and risk proﬁles.
18These 38 funds are extracted from a database provided by the company Standard & Poor’s. Equity
Hedge covers several different strategies whose investments are focused on the equity markets. Its two large









































6Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Funds Min Max Me SD SK KU S-W K-S J-B
(%) (%) (%) (%)
1 -6.16 10.20 0.68 3.77 0.34 -0.35 0.98 0.11 1.43
2 -7.89 7.69 0.16 3.33 -0.07 -0.25 0.99 0.06 0.20
3 -12.51 19.66 -0.30 5.59 0.32 1.86 0.95** 0.12 9.72***
4 -7.25 5.63 0.25 3.04 -0.27 -0.49 0.98 0.07 1.31
5 -11.37 11.95 0.10 4.65 -0.10 0.09 0.99 0.06 0.12
6 -6.50 5.92 0.06 2.34 -0.36 0.29 0.98 0.08 1.50
7 -14.67 24.36 -0.11 6.23 0.91 3.37 0.95*** 0.11 36.60***
8 -22.96 33.89 -0.18 8.86 0.71 2.69 0.96** 0.06 23.09***
9 -7.87 8.59 -0.01 3.92 -0.01 -0.43 0.98 0.07 0.46
10 -11.84 13.05 0.03 5.40 0.16 -0.12 0.99 0.08 0.29
11 -8.19 17.11 1.08* 4.95 1.18 2.13 0.92*** 0.16* 25.40***
12 -13.49 9.11 0.01 4.35 -0.43 0.66 0.98 0.08 2.98
13 -6.77 7.23 -0.57 3.36 0.12 -0.75 0.98 0.07 1.53
14 -40.85 19.45 -0.73 9.02 -1.42 5.88 0.90*** 0.15 106.6***
15 -12.04 14.17 0.23 5.53 -0.05 0.06 0.98 0.07 0.03
16 -5.76 6.58 0.24 2.83 0.13 -0.22 0.99 0.06 0.29
17 -7.10 6.27 0.33 3.25 -0.15 -0.49 0.98 0.06 0.83
18 -6.33 5.94 0.15 2.65 0.00 -0.33 0.99 0.08 0.28
19 -7.21 8.18 0.25 3.43 0.17 -0.46 0.99 0.06 0.81
20 -9.90 14.45 0.12 4.54 0.25 0.71 0.99 0.05 1.91
21 -6.81 9.77 0.64* 2.75 0.48 2.08 0.96* 0.10 13.19***
22 -9.20 7.57 -0.23 3.95 -0.09 -0.38 0.99 0.05 0.44
23 -5.31 6.82 0.33 2.48 0.62 0.59 0.96** 0.15 4.66***
24 -13.75 15.03 -0.81 5.72 -0.10 0.30 0.98 0.09 0.33
25 -9.78 19.59 0.09 5.46 1.35 3.85 0.90*** 0.12 55.13***
26 -16.34 25.90 1.34 * 5.31 1.35 10.02 0.72*** 0.24*** 269.3***
27 -1.24 5.45 0.52*** 1.10 1.64 5.81 0.88 *** 0.17* 111.2***
28 -2.37 15.86 0.74 ** 2.39 4.36 27.27 0.63 *** 0.19** 2050***
29 -15.48 22.37 0.64 5.07 1.23 7.06 0.85 *** 0.16* 139.7***
30 -13.76 17.90 -0.35 5.29 0.50 1.86 0.97 0.09 11.22***
31 -14.30 17.93 0.28 5.00 0.21 2.69 0.95** 0.10 18.58***
32 -6.93 11.54 0.00 3.15 0.73 2.47 0.96** 0.08 20.64***
33 -7.88 11.53 0.08 4.07 0.58 0.71 0.97 0.08 4.57
34 -7.12 8.67 -0.07 4.12 0.20 -0.64 0.97 0.08 1.42
35 -5.68 10.93 1.10*** 2.97 0.38 1.30 0.96 * 0.12 5.66*
36 -10.13 7.95 0.58 3.75 -0.29 -0.05 0.98 0.08 0.82
37 -6.48 11.01 0.38 2.60 0.71 4.25 0.93 *** 0.10 50.14***
38 -9.93 12.48 -0.13 4.10 0.04 0.71 0.98 0.07 1.26
Me = Mean, SD = Standard deviation, SK = Skewness, KU = Kurtosis excess relatively to
the normal distribution. S-W = Shapiro-Wilk, K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov, J-B = Jarque-Bera
are normality tests on return distributions. ***, **, ** denote the rejection of the normality









































64.2 Assessing hedge fund local performance
4.2.1 Settings
Due to unavailable data on sales loads charged by the funds in the sample, illustrations
are limited to considering their historical return and risk proﬁles. Since the distribution of
hedge fund returns is documented as usually non gaussian, it is important to incorporate
these features into the selection of evaluation criteria (DEA’s inputs and outputs). Several
settings are likely.
The ﬁrst setting assumes the case where investors have a positive preference for odd
moments and a negative preference for even moments. Given these preference, it is
logical to include in the inputs the standard deviation and the kurtosis of returns, and in
the outputs the mean and the skewness. In this conﬁguration, the problem of negative
outputs raises. More speciﬁcally, 11 out of 38 funds under consideration have a negative
mean, 12 funds have a negative skewness, 4 funds among them have simultaneously
negative mean and negative skewness.
The second setting is designed in the spirit of Gregoriou et al. (2005) and Kooli et
al. (2005), following which it is more clever to reason in terms of partial variations. As
documented in the literature, investors are likely to be averse only to volatility under
the Minimum Accepted Return (MAR)19, which are called lower variations. In contrast,
they appreciate volatility above this value, which are called upper variations. Thus, the
composition of inputs and outputs can be determined in the following manner. The
inputs include lower mean, lower semi-standard deviation, lower semi-skewness and
lower semi-kurtosis which are obtained from returns lower than the MAR represented by
the average rate over the period january 2000 to december 2004 of the US 3-month T-bill.
The outputs contain upper mean, upper semi-standard deviation, upper semi-skewness
and upper semi-kurtosis obtained from returns greater than the MAR. In addition to his
ﬁnancial ﬁnesse, this conﬁguration has the clear-cut advantage to avoid the problem of
negative inputs and outputs.
Now assume furthermore that investors are more concerned for extreme values than
central ones. Hence, they naturally pay more attention to the skewness and the kurtosis
than to the mean and the standard deviation. Mathematically, they will require that the
contribution of the upper (lower) skewness and kurtosis to the efﬁciency score of the
fund must be greater than or equal to the contribution of the upper (lower) mean and
19The determination of the Minimum Accepted Return is purely subjective and speciﬁc to each investor. It









































6standard deviation. This preference can be taken into consideration by adding four more
constraints on virtual weights into the optimization system:
y3ju3 > y1ju1 ; x3jv3 > x1jv1
y3ju3 > y2ju2 ; x3jv3 > x2jv2
y4ju4 > y1ju1 ; x4jv4 > x1jv1
y4ju4 > y2ju2 ; x4jv4 > x2jv2
where y1j,y2j,y3j,y4j are the amount of upper mean, upper standard deviation, upper
skewness and upper kurtosis of the fund j under consideration; x1j,x2j,x3j,x4j are the
amount of its lower mean, lower standard deviation, lower skewness and lower kurtosis;
u1,u2,u3,u4,v1,v2,v3,v4 are the weights associated respectively with these outputs and
inputs.
Otherwise, if investors are more or less markowitzian, i.e. they rely essentially on the
mean and standard deviation to assess fund performance, the following constraints are
necessary so that this preference is incorporated:
y1ju1 > y3ju3 ; x1jv1 > x3jv3
y1ju1 > y4ju4 ; x1jv1 > x4jv4
y2ju2 > y3ju3 ; x2jv2 > x3jv3
y2ju2 > y4ju4 ; x2jv2 > x4jv4
The third setting illustrates another case where investors need to reconcile funds’ local
performance over several horizons, from a long period to a more recent period in the past.
To this end, DEA inputs are modeled by the MVAR (described by the denominator of
equation 23) representing the loss limits over three horizons: 1 year, 3 years and 5 years;
outputs are the mean returns over these three horizons. Again, many cases of negative
outputs are found: 12 cases over the one-year horizon, 22 cases over the three-year horizon
and 11 cases over the ﬁve-year horizon, among them 5 funds have all negative outputs.
It is important to keep in mind that the above settings are only some standard con-
ﬁgurations used by investors. Given the diversity of investors’ preferences, many other









































64.2.2 Choice of CCR version
After inputs and outputs corresponding to investors’ preferences are speciﬁed, the next
step consists in running the foregoing inputs and outputs under the CCR model. Then
what version to choose, input-oriented or output-oriented? Following principles high-
lighted in the section 3.3, we are constraint to adopt the input-oriented version for the
ﬁrst and the third settings where outputs are sometimes all negative. Regarding the sec-
ond setting, either version is possible. However, in this study, the input-oriented version
is chosen for all settings. Its primal and dual programs are described respectively by the
systems (7-10) and (15-18).
Note that the weights assigned to each output and input are constrained to be equal
to or greater than 0.001 (ε = 0.001)20 to assure that all criteria are considered in the
optimization program.
4.2.3 Results
Table 2 displays detailed results on DEA score, absolute weights (u, v) and virtual weights
(uy, vx) obtained under a CCR input-oriented setting with mean and skewness as outputs,
standard deviation and kurtosis as inputs. Funds with negative scores are those having
simultaneously negative mean and negative skewness. Given the difference of measure
scale between mean, standard deviation on the one hand and skewness, kurtosis on the
other hand, virtual weights rather than absolute weights are more informative about key
factors (inputs and outputs) that make some funds dominant compared to others in the
sample. Each of the ﬁve funds qualiﬁed as dominant (1, 11, 27, 28, 35) has its own
combination of evaluation criteria to attain the full efﬁciency. For fund 27 and fund 35,
the virtual weights associated with the mean and the standard deviation are much higher
than those associated with the skewness and the kurtosis. By referring to the statistics
of returns given in table 1, we ﬁnd that they effectively have fairly high mean and small
standard deviation in comparison with the others. Their proﬁles are thus well adapted
to markowitzian investors. By contrast, the dominance of fund 28 is primarily due to
its positive skewness. In fact, this fund has the highest positive skewness in the sample.
With fund 1, the dominance is mainly based on the mean and the kurtosis while with
fund 11, dominant factors are the mean, the skewness and the kurtosis. These ﬁndings
imply that not all dominant funds are necessarily adapted to an investor having a precise
20In fact, all calculations were already tested with several values of ε: 0, 0.0001, 0.001 and 0.01. However,
performance scores changed very slightly while the relative rank between funds remains unchanged. Thus,









































6preference. Consequently, when no additional constraint is formulated like in this setting,
an investor who is not completely indifferent among evaluation criteria should identify
the factors determining the efﬁciency of dominant funds and select only those whose
proﬁles correspond the most to his preferences.
Results on DEA scores across various settings are summarized in table 3. Note that
in the ﬁrst and the third settings (respectively in columns 2 and 6), funds with negative
scores are those whose all outputs are negative. Several points are noteworthy. In general,
results are rather sensitive to the speciﬁcation of evaluation criteria and supplementary
constraints. Not only the number of dominant funds varies (from 1 to 5) but also dom-
inant members differ across settings. Look at for example fund 26 which is qualiﬁed as
dominant only when its returns and risks over three horizons are considered simultane-
ously.
Related to the second setting, as would be expected, the introduction of additional
constraints on virtual weights naturally deteriorates efﬁciency scores and the short list
of dominant funds becomes more selective. When preferences for extreme values (repre-
sented by the skewness and the kurtosis) are explicitly formulated, only fund 28 (among
ﬁve funds 1, 8, 11, 25, 28 qualiﬁed as dominant without any additional constraints) sat-
isﬁes this requirement. Similarly, when more importance is explicitly attached to central
values (represented by the mean and the standard deviation), there are only three funds
8, 11, 28 in the dominant list. These results highlight the importance of correct speciﬁca-
tion of relevant DEA inputs and outputs as well as additional constraints which reﬂect
best investors’ evaluation preferences.
At empirical level, one may notice persistent dominance of several funds across set-
tings like the case of fund 28, which stays dominant whatever preferences are considered.
This feature can be regarded as a sign of the robustness of fund 28’s performance rela-
tively to other funds in the sample.
Since we are examining funds’ local performance without sales loads, it could be
interesting at this point to contrast DEA results in the ﬁrst and the second settings with
fund rankings provided by the traditional Sharpe ratio (Sharpe 1966) and the M-Sharpe






where r is the average return of the fund, rf is the average risk-free rate approximated









































6Table 2: Performance with standard deviation-kurtosis as inputs, mean-skewness as out-
puts
Funds Scorea Absolute weights (u, v)b Virtual weights (uy, vx)
Me SK SD KU Me SK SD KU
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1 1 147.427 0.001 0.167 0.375 0.9997 0.0003 0.0063 0.9937
2 0.228 142.003 0.001 0.161 0.361 0.2284 -0.0001 0.0054 0.9946
3 0.286 0.001 0.891 0.001 0.206 0.0000 0.2864 0.0001 0.9999
4 0.389 155.891 0.001 0.176 0.396 0.3888 -0.0003 0.0054 0.9946
5 0.127 126.330 0.001 0.001 0.323 0.1270 -0.0001 0.0000 1.0000
6 0.077 119.256 0.001 0.136 0.303 0.0774 -0.0004 0.0032 0.9968
7 0.618 0.001 0.681 0.001 0.157 0.0000 0.6181 0.0001 0.9999
8 0.537 0.001 0.762 0.001 0.176 0.0000 0.5374 0.0001 0.9999
9 -0.000 0.001 0.001 25.456 0.001 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.9974 0.0026
10 0.240 0.001 1.507 0.001 0.348 0.0000 0.2403 0.0001 0.9999
11 1 66.707 0.237 1.281 0.182 0.7193 0.2807 0.0635 0.9365
12 0.006 106.752 0.001 0.122 0.272 0.0062 -0.0004 0.0053 0.9947
13 0.222 0.001 1.925 0.001 0.444 0.0000 0.2219 0.0000 1.0000
14 -0.001 0.001 0.001 10.984 0.001 0.0000 -0.0014 0.9911 0.0089
15 0.295 127.735 0.001 0.001 0.327 0.2947 -0.0001 0.0001 0.9999
16 0.347 122.726 0.436 2.357 0.336 0.2899 0.0566 0.0668 0.9332
17 0.514 155.511 0.001 0.176 0.396 0.5140 -0.0002 0.0057 0.9943
18 0.215 146.828 0.001 0.166 0.373 0.2148 0.0000 0.0044 0.9956
19 0.412 126.397 0.556 0.001 0.394 0.3183 0.0937 0.0000 1.0000
20 0.297 0.001 1.168 0.001 0.269 0.0000 0.2966 0.0000 1.0000
21 0.684 68.216 0.508 15.009 0.116 0.4380 0.2463 0.4122 0.5878
22 -0.000 0.001 0.001 25.250 0.001 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.9974 0.0026
23 0.793 0.001 1.289 6.883 0.231 0.0000 0.7929 0.1706 0.8294
24 -0.000 0.001 0.001 17.422 0.001 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.9967 0.0033
25 0.888 0.001 0.659 3.518 0.118 0.0000 0.8877 0.1922 0.8078
26 0.695 29.615 0.221 6.516 0.050 0.3973 0.2977 0.3461 0.6539
27 1 193.390 0.001 90.268 0.001 0.9984 0.0016 0.9912 0.0088
28 1 33.048 0.173 40.581 0.001 0.2437 0.7563 0.9697 0.0303
29 0.592 0.001 0.482 2.576 0.086 0.0000 0.5918 0.1306 0.8694
30 0.448 0.001 0.891 0.001 0.206 0.0000 0.4482 0.0001 0.9999
31 0.212 60.499 0.215 1.162 0.165 0.1664 0.0460 0.0581 0.9419
32 0.639 0.001 0.871 4.652 0.156 0.0000 0.6393 0.1463 0.8537
33 0.675 0.001 1.170 0.001 0.270 0.0000 0.6747 0.0000 1.0000
34 0.361 0.001 1.840 0.001 0.424 0.0000 0.3607 0.0000 1.0000
35 1 91.251 0.001 31.662 0.014 0.9996 0.0004 0.9390 0.0610
36 0.773 132.376 0.001 0.150 0.337 0.7735 -0.0003 0.0056 0.9944
37 0.502 55.541 0.414 12.220 0.094 0.2083 0.2940 0.3175 0.6825
38 0.044 0.001 1.170 0.001 0.270 0.0000 0.0439 0.0000 1.0000
Note: Me = Mean, SK = Skewness, SD = Standard deviation, KU = Kurtosis. Values in italics
are approximative.
aFunds with negative scores are those whose mean and skewness are simultaneously
negative.









































6Table 3: Local performance
DEA scores Rank Rank
Funds Standarda Partial momentsb Horizonsc Sharpe M-Sharpe
moments Standard Preference Preference
SK & KU Me & SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 1 1 0.52 0.93 0.46 7 7
2 0.23 0.71 0.38 0.69 0.46 18 18
3 0.29 0.83 0.69 0.71 -0.00 33 34
4 0.39 0.66 0.37 0.64 0.19 14 15
5 0.13 0.78 0.36 0.77 0.08 21 20
6 0.08 0.64 0.35 0.58 0.93 29 28
7 0.62 0.86 0.67 0.81 0.21 27 29
8 0.54 1 0.62 1 0.11 25 26
9 0.00 0.72 0.44 0.67 0.22 28 27
10 0.24 0.85 0.36 0.84 0.14 23 23
11 1 1 0.60 1 0.83 5 4
12 0.01 0.68 0.32 0.66 0.24 26 25
13 0.22 0.79 0.38 0.74 -0.00 38 38
14 0.00 0.62 0.21 0.61 1 34 31
15 0.29 0.89 0.45 0.75 0.10 17 17
16 0.35 0.72 0.41 0.70 0.24 16 16
17 0.51 0.80 0.32 0.78 0.63 12 12
18 0.21 0.71 0.39 0.68 0.14 22 21
19 0.41 0.78 0.44 0.76 0.19 15 14
20 0.30 0.85 0.45 0.84 1 19 19
21 0.68 0.75 0.44 0.72 0.70 6 6
22 0.00 0.85 0.31 0.82 -0.00 36 35
23 0.79 0.88 0.37 0.83 0.26 11 11
24 0.00 0.72 0.46 0.70 0.48 37 37
25 0.89 1 0.72 0.97 0.04 20 22
26 0.70 0.72 0.65 0.59 1 4 5
27 1 0.92 0.92 0.81 0.96 2 2
28 1 1 1 1 1 3 1
29 0.59 0.75 0.59 0.66 0.41 9 8
30 0.45 0.89 0.45 0.85 0.35 35 36
31 0.21 0.83 0.43 0.82 0.71 13 13
32 0.64 0.70 0.58 0.66 0.17 30 32
33 0.67 0.94 0.45 0.91 0.26 24 24
34 0.36 0.91 0.44 0.88 -0.00 31 30
35 1 0.76 0.52 0.74 1 1 3
36 0.77 0.84 0.30 0.82 0.37 8 9
37 0.50 0.63 0.58 0.59 0.44 10 10
38 0.04 0.80 0.43 0.76 -0.00 32 33
Rank correlation (Sharpe & M-Sharpe) 0.995
Note: Results are obtained from the CCR input-oriented version with ε = 0.001. Funds with
negative scores are those whose all outputs are simultaneously negative. Me = Mean, SK =
Skewness, SD = Standard deviation, KU = Kurtosis.
aIn the ﬁrst setting, inputs are standard deviation and kurtosis, outputs are mean and skew-
ness.
bIn the second setting, inputs are composed of lower mean, lower semi standard deviation,
lower skewness and lower kurtosis; outputs contain upper mean, upper semi standard deviation,
upper skewness and upper kurtosis.
cIn the third setting, inputs include the MVAR over the previous year, the 3 previous years









































6the Sharpe ratio is based on the mean-variance paradigm while the modiﬁed Sharpe ratio
takes account of the skewness and the kurtosis.
Fund rankings according to these two ratios are reported in the columns 7 and 8 of
table 3. Several main observations can be drawn from these results. We can see easily
that despite differences in the approach taken by the two measures, fund rankings are
surprisingly quite similar, both in terms of correlation coefﬁcient (0.995) and in terms of
direct contrasting from fund to fund. Does this strong similarity imply that the return
distribution of all funds is quite close to the normal one? The answer according to the
Shapiro-Wilk normality test is rather negative because the normality assumption is re-
jected in 14 among 38 cases at the conﬁdence level of 95% (see table 1). However, ﬁnding
explanations to such problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
Regarding the connection of DEA classiﬁcations (except for the third setting) with
Sharpe and M-Sharpe rankings, the results show that most dominant funds are generally
among the seven funds the most highly ranked by Sharpe and M-Sharpe ratios. Nev-
ertheless, funds 8 (dominant once) and 25 (dominant twice) in the second setting are
only placed respectively at the 25th and 20th rank by Sharpe, 26th and 22th by M-Sharpe.
This disfavor is certainly related to the slightly negative mean of fund 28 (-0.18%) and
to the quite low positive mean of fund 25 (0.09%). A closer examination of their return
distributions reveals much wider dispersal of returns and higher frequency of extreme
positive values in these two distributions than in those of other funds ranked before them
by Sharpe and M-Sharpe ratios. It is undoubtedly the reason why these funds are highly
praised by the second setting of DEA. An investor who likes good surprises would ﬁnd
his interests in these proﬁles. Yet, if he used only Sharpe and M-Sharpe ratios, he would
have missed his chance, at least in the case of this sample. Such result provides evidence
that DEA can be an efﬁcient supplementary tool to assist investors in selecting correctly
funds satisfying their preferences.
4.3 Assessing hedge fund global performance
4.3.1 Settings
As argued previously, investors may sometimes want to evaluate local performance of
funds (1) on several horizons simultaneously or (2) by using several measures at the same
time. In these cases, how will they reconcile between elementary performances ? On









































6particularly difﬁcult when elementary performances provide divergent rankings of funds.
Meanwhile, by means of optimizing the weighted sum of elementary performances, DEA
offers an aggregate measure allowing investors to identify funds having the best combina-
tion of these performances. In other words, by combining multiple performance criteria
simultaneously, DEA provides an exhaustive image of funds. In order to illustrate the
ﬁrst setting, the M-Sharpe performance ratio over three horizons — the previous year, the
three previous years, the ﬁve previous years — are used as elementary performances. In
the second setting, three performance measures which consider the non normal features
of returns are selected, namely modiﬁed Stutzer index (Stutzer 2000, Kaplan & Knowles
2001), M-Sharpe ratio and Omega index (Keating & Shadwick 2002). The formulas to






















where rt is fund return on month t, sign(r) is the sign of the mean return, θ is a negative
number, T is the number of monthly returns, rft is risk-free rate (approximated by the US
3-month T-bill rate) on month t, τ is the MAR pre-determined by investors (approximated
by the US 3-month T-bill rate’s average over the study period). It is necessary to specify
that the modiﬁed Stutzer index (hereafter, M-Stutzer) considers up to the skewness of
returns, the M-Sharpe ratio takes into account both the skewness and the kurtosis while
the Omega index regards the whole (empirical) distribution of returns.
These two settings are characterized as having only outputs. Since there are no inputs,
it is possible to assume existence of one input equal to one so that DEA can be applied.
Given this feature, the input-oriented version is required. Besides, investors are also as-
sumed to be indifferent among horizons and performance indicators so that no additional
constraints are needed.
4.3.2 Results
Table 4 reports detailed results of the two settings under consideration. In panel A pre-
senting fund classiﬁcation over three horizons, empirical results conﬁrm that fund per-









































6Table 4: Global performance
Panel A: Perf. over 3 horizons Panel B: Perf. over 5 years with 3 measures
M-Sh over Global Perf. M-St Ω M-Sh Global Perf.
Funds 5 years 3 years 1 year Rank Score Rank Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1 7 21 27 16 0.2028 7 7 7 7 0.657
2 18 17 11 13 0.2854 22 18 18 18 0.430
3 34 26 35 33 -0.0003 33 34 34 34 0.334
4 15 28 28 29 0.0153 24 13 15 13 0.466
5 20 25 36 31 -0.0002 19 21 20 21 0.416
6 28 8 3 6 0.6827 11 29 28 29 0.374
7 29 23 18 22 0.0806 29 30 29 30 0.365
8 26 14 23 27 0.0419 28 28 26 28 0.380
9 27 11 25 24 0.0734 30 26 27 26 0.389
10 23 16 20 25 0.0568 17 23 23 23 0.409
11 4 22 17 12 0.3600 5 5 4 5 0.745
12 25 10 26 21 0.0951 13 25 25 25 0.391
13 38 37 37 37 -0.0005 38 38 38 38 0.260
14 31 6 1 1 1 35 36 31 36 0.310
15 17 24 31 30 0.0034 27 16 17 16 0.450
16 16 29 19 23 0.0749 26 15 16 15 0.459
17 12 27 6 9 0.5109 16 12 12 12 0.494
18 21 35 34 36 -0.0003 18 19 21 19 0.419
19 14 32 30 28 0.0162 25 14 14 14 0.461
20 19 13 2 4 0.9856 21 20 19 20 0.416
21 6 7 8 7 0.5718 6 6 6 6 0.661
22 35 33 32 35 -0.0003 36 33 35 33 0.341
23 11 12 22 20 0.1046 14 11 11 11 0.497
24 37 18 7 11 0.4276 37 37 37 37 0.278
25 22 31 29 32 -0.0002 20 24 22 24 0.408
26 5 1 4 1 1 4 4 5 4 0.877
27 2 5 13 8 0.5565 1 2 2 1 1
28 1 3 9 1 1 3 3 1 1 1
29 8 15 16 15 0.2217 9 9 8 9 0.530
30 36 20 14 17 0.1691 34 35 36 35 0.318
31 13 4 10 10 0.4409 23 17 13 17 0.438
32 32 36 21 26 0.0504 10 31 32 31 0.358
33 24 34 15 18 0.1415 15 22 24 22 0.409
34 30 38 38 38 -0.0006 31 27 30 27 0.382
35 3 2 5 5 0.8112 2 1 3 1 1
36 9 19 24 19 0.1411 8 8 9 8 0.568
37 10 9 12 14 0.2675 12 10 10 10 0.500
38 33 30 33 34 -0.0003 32 32 33 32 0.355
Correlation
M-Sh 3 years 0.71
M-Sh 5 years 0.49 0.34 0.82 0.99
Ω 0.82
Note: M-Sh = modiﬁed Sharpe ratio, M-St = modiﬁed Stutzer index, Ω = Omega index. Funds with









































6lation between classiﬁcations are rather weak: 0.49 (5 years versus 3 years), 0.34 (5 years
versus 1 year) and 0.71 (1 year versus 3 years). The most striking example is fund 14 clas-
siﬁed at the 31th position over ﬁve-year horizon but at 6th and 1th ranks over respectively
three-year and one-year horizons. According to DEA, this fund is classiﬁed as dominant
with an aggregate score of 1. In detail, it is found to have the performance over one-year
horizon not only classiﬁed at the 1st rank but also sufﬁciently high to compensate for the
slightly negative performance over ﬁve-year horizon so as to arrive ﬁnally at the head
of the sample. Unlike fund 14, two other dominant funds according to the DEA global
performance score — funds 26 and 28 — have very stable performance proﬁles over time.
With regard to fund rankings according to the three selected performance indicators
(Panel B), contrary to the preceding case, classiﬁcations are overall very coherent between
them. This coherence is conﬁrmed by high coefﬁcients of rank correlation: 0.99 (M-Sharpe
with Omega), 0.82 (M-Sharpe with M-Stutzer) and 0.82 (Omega with M-Stutzer). Such
ﬁnding certainly does not provide an ideal illustration of the problem which this study
aims to illustrate here. Nevertheless, in detail, rankings given by the M-Stutzer index
and those provided by the M-Sharpe ratio and the Omega index are quite divergent on
several occasions. It is particularly true for fund 6 which is ranked at the 11th place by
the M-Stutzer index but ranked only at the 29th and the 28th places in the classiﬁcation
of respectively the Omega index and the M-Sharpe ratio. The other examples are funds
4, 10, 12, 15, 16, 19 and 32. In such cases, applying DEA to determine deﬁnitive ranks of
these funds presents an undeniable interest.
Finally, three funds globally qualiﬁed as dominant are funds 27, 28 and 35. All of
them are the most highly ranked of the sample, no matter what measure is used. In
these cases, the dominance of these funds is obvious, DEA can only conﬁrm it. Only
when performance measures disagree on fund rankings that DEA proves its perspicacity
by providing for each fund an aggregate indicator of performance allowing a global and
deﬁnitive classiﬁcation. Such is the case of funds 14, 18, 22, 25, 31, 33 and 34. Consider
for example fund 25. It is ranked 20th by the M-Stutzer index, 24th by the Omega index
and 22th by the M-Sharpe ratio. However, according to DEA, it is globally placed only
24th when all three performance indicators are considered. Similarly, fund 34 is at the
31th position of the list according to M-Stutzer, 27th according to Omega, 30th according










































Previous studies documented that DEA could be a good tool to solve decision-making
problems with multiple criteria, including investment fund performance evaluating task.
This paper shows that DEA is particularly adapted to assess hedge fund performance
for the following reasons. First, it can incorporate multiple risk-return attributes of non
normal returns in an unique aggregate score so as to rank funds. Hence, DEA can be
used to evaluate local and global performances of hedge funds. The local performance
is obtained when evaluation criteria include risks, eventually sales loads (DEA’s inputs)
and returns (DEA’s outputs). The global performance is deﬁned as the aggregate score
of several elementary performances which could be performances over several temporal
horizons, or performances over one temporal horizon but measured by different indica-
tors. Second, unlike other performance measures, DEA offers investors the possibility to
exert direct control on the importance level paid to each evaluation criteria. Thus, each in-
vestor can tailor his own performance measure to select funds corresponding the most to
his own preferences. This ﬂexibility is very important as in reality, each investor usually
has his own preferences and constraints. Third, by putting emphasis on the best observed
funds, DEA makes no assumption on the functional relation between evaluation criteria.
To this end, this paper focuses on the most important methodological issues concern-
ing the application of the basic CCR model to hedge fund performance appraisal, namely
(1) the choice of evaluation criteria as DEA’s inputs and outputs, (2) the choice between
input-oriented or output-oriented version of the CCR model, (3) dealing with negative
inputs and outputs, and (4) transcribing investors’ speciﬁc preferences into mathemati-
cal constraints. These elements are presented in such a way to provide investors with
a general framework to apply DEA in assessing fund performance. In order to make
these guidelines more intuitive, several numerical illustrations with thorough discussion
of results are provided on a sample of 38 hedge funds. The illustrations also highlight
the importance of correct speciﬁcation of evaluation criteria and preference structure for
efﬁcient application of DEA. A comparison between DEA classiﬁcation and rankings pro-
vided by traditional Sharpe and modiﬁed Sharpe ratios indicates that they are sometimes
radically inconsistent. Further examination of funds’ return distributions suggests that
these latter two measures might not price properly good surprises (extremely high posi-
tive returns). In such case, DEA proves to be a good supplement to improve the precision
of selection tasks. Although this paper only addresses the application of DEA in the
hedge fund context, its guidelines are also applicable to other types of investment funds









































6Like any other tools, DEA also has its caveats. One of the main weakness arises
from the fact that DEA basic models does not provide complete rankings of dominant
funds. Nevertheless, this weakness can be mitigated by either adding more restrictive
preferences (additional mathematical constraints) so that the short list becomes more and
more selective, or applying other qualitative and quantitative criteria on dominant funds
so as to rank them. Besides, the dominance or efﬁciency of funds is only relative to the
other funds in the sample and thus can be changed once the sample is modiﬁed. However,
relative evaluation is a well-established concept in economic literature (Holmstrom 1982).
In addition, the relative property of fund evaluation is still quite valuable because in the
investment industry, funds are often rated relatively to others in the same category. A
broad literature documented that the investment fund market is a tournament and the
managers compete against each other in the same category to attract investors (Brown et
al. 1996, Agarwal et al. 2003, Kristiansen 2005).
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